public inbox for git@vger.kernel.org 
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Joey Hess <id@joeyh•name>
To: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox•com>
Cc: git@vger•kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] Fix various overly aggressive protections in 2.45.1 and friends
Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 06:01:40 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zk3ChIHr5amGh8Mt@kitenet.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240521195659.870714-1-gitster@pobox.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 967 bytes --]

Junio C Hamano wrote:
> As people have seen, the latest "security fix" release turned out to
> be a mixed bag of good vulnerability fixes with a bit over-eager
> "layered defence" that broke real uses cases like git-lfs.

"fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
(a33fea0886cfa016d313d2bd66bdd08615bffbc9) also broke pushing git-annex
repositories to eg Gitlab and has several other problems including dodgy
PATH_MAX checks that cause new OS interoperability problems. (I posted
details to an earlier thread but have now found this current one, oops.)

Please also revert it, or at least the portions for 
and symlinkPointsToGitDir and symlinkTargetLength. The
checks for symlinkTargetBlob and symlinkTargetMissing seem worth
keeping.

> Let's quickly get them in working order back first, with the vision that
> we will then rebuild layered defence more carefully in the open on
> top as necessary.

Exellent plan.

-- 
see shy jo

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 833 bytes --]

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-22 10:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-21 19:56 [PATCH 00/12] Fix various overly aggressive protections in 2.45.1 and friends Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 01/12] send-email: drop FakeTerm hack Junio C Hamano
2024-05-22  8:19   ` Dragan Simic
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 02/12] send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object Junio C Hamano
2024-05-22  8:15   ` Dragan Simic
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 03/12] ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 04/12] ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 05/12] ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 06/12] hook: plug a new memory leak Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 07/12] init: use the correct path of the templates directory again Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 08/12] Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning" Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 09/12] tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 22:57   ` Brooke Kuhlmann
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 10/12] clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 11/12] Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents" Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 19:56 ` [PATCH 12/12] Revert "fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories" Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 20:43   ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-22  7:27     ` Johannes Schindelin
2024-05-22 17:20       ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 20:45 ` [rPATCH 13/12] Merge branch 'jc/fix-aggressive-protection-2.39' Junio C Hamano
2024-05-23 10:36   ` Reviewing merge commits, was " Johannes Schindelin
2024-05-23 14:41     ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 20:45 ` [rPATCH 14/12] Merge branch 'jc/fix-aggressive-protection-2.40' Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 21:33   ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 21:14 ` [PATCH 00/12] Fix various overly aggressive protections in 2.45.1 and friends Johannes Schindelin
2024-05-21 21:46   ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-21 22:13     ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-22 10:01 ` Joey Hess [this message]
2024-05-23  5:49   ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-23 16:31     ` Joey Hess
2024-05-27 19:51       ` Johannes Schindelin
2024-05-28  2:25         ` Joey Hess
2024-05-28 15:02         ` Phillip Wood
2024-05-28 16:13           ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-28 17:47           ` Junio C Hamano
2024-05-23 23:32     ` Junio C Hamano

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=Zk3ChIHr5amGh8Mt@kitenet.net \
    --to=id@joeyh$(echo .)name \
    --cc=git@vger$(echo .)kernel.org \
    --cc=gitster@pobox$(echo .)com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox