Subject: Patch "x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 20:30:41 +0200

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-speculation-support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <[email-masked]> know about it.

>From foo@baz Tue 14 May 2019 08:29:35 PM CEST
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:29 -0500
Subject: x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email-masked]>

commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 upstream.

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email-masked]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email-masked]>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <[email-masked]> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <[email-masked]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email-masked]>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <[email-masked]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email-masked]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email-masked]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email-masked]>
Cc: Waiman Long <[email-masked]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email-masked]>
Cc: Jon Masters <[email-masked]>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email-masked]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email-masked]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[email-masked]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email-masked]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email-masked]>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <[email-masked]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email-masked]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email-masked]>
Cc: Steven Price <[email-masked]>
Cc: Phil Auld <[email-masked]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email-masked]
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - Drop the auto,nosmt option and the l1tf mitigation selection, which we can't
   support
 - Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email-masked]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email-masked]>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |   14 +++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c          |    6 ++++--
 arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c                |    4 +++-
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2174,15 +2174,19 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
-			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
-			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
-			options.
+			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2190,7 +2194,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
 				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
 				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
-				This is the default behavior.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -743,7 +744,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ss
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Kernel/User page tables isolation: " fmt
@@ -297,7 +298,8 @@ void __init kaiser_check_boottime_disabl
 			goto skip;
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		goto disable;
 
 skip:

Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email-masked] are

queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-fix-documentation-typo.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-add-mitigations-support-for-mds.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-rework-smt-state-change.patch
queue-4.4/cpu-speculation-add-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-fix-comment.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-reorder-the-spec_v2-code.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-add-prctl-control-for-indirect-branch-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-provide-ibpb-always-command-line-options.patch
queue-4.4/x86-kconfig-select-sched_smt-if-smp-enabled.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-add-smt-warning-message.patch
queue-4.4/x86-process-consolidate-and-simplify-switch_to_xtra-code.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-reorganize-speculation-control-msrs-update.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-update-the-tif_ssbd-comment.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-propagate-information-about-rsb-filling-mitigation-to-sysfs.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-unify-conditional-spectre-v2-print-functions.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-disable-stibp-when-enhanced-ibrs-is-in-use.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-rename-ssbd-update-functions.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-enable-prctl-mode-for-spectre_v2_user.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mark-string-arrays-const-correctly.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-move-arch_smt_update-call-to-after-mitigation-decisions.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-add-seccomp-spectre-v2-user-space-protection-mode.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-clean-up-spectre_v2_parse_cmdline.patch
queue-4.4/x86-mm-use-write_once-when-setting-ptes.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-apply-ibpb-more-strictly-to-avoid-cross-process-data-leak.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-add-command-line-control-for-indirect-branch-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-move-stipb-ibpb-string-conditionals-out-of-cpu_show_common.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-remove-unnecessary-ret-variable-in-cpu_show_common.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-prepare-for-per-task-indirect-branch-speculation-control.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-avoid-__switch_to_xtra-calls.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-print-smt-vulnerable-on-msbds-with-mitigations-off.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-split-out-tif-update.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-prepare-for-conditional-ibpb-in-switch_mm.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-prepare-arch_smt_update-for-prctl-mode.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-enable-cross-hyperthread-spectre-v2-stibp-mitigation.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculataion-mark-command-line-parser-data-__initdata.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-prevent-stale-spec_ctrl-msr-content.patch

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