Subject: Summary of LPC guest MSI discussion in Santa Fe (was: Re: [RFC 0/8] KVM PCIe/MSI passthrough on ARM/ARM64 (Alt II))

From: [email-masked] (Will Deacon)
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2016 02:45:59 +0000

Hi all,

I figured this was a reasonable post to piggy-back on for the LPC minutes
relating to guest MSIs on arm64.

On Thu, Nov 03, 2016 at 10:02:05PM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> We can always have QEMU reject hot-adding the device if the reserved
> region overlaps existing guest RAM, but I don't even really see how we
> advise users to give them a reasonable chance of avoiding that
> possibility.  Apparently there are also ARM platforms where MSI pages
> cannot be remapped to support the previous programmable user/VM
> address, is it even worthwhile to support those platforms?  Does that
> decision influence whether user programmable MSI reserved regions are
> really a second class citizen to fixed reserved regions?  I expect
> we'll be talking about this tomorrow morning, but I certainly haven't
> come up with any viable solutions to this.  Thanks,

At LPC last week, we discussed guest MSIs on arm64 as part of the PCI
microconference. I presented some slides to illustrate some of the issues
we're trying to solve:

  http://www.willdeacon.ukfsn.org/bitbucket/lpc-16/msi-in-guest-arm64.pdf

Punit took some notes (thanks!) on the etherpad here:

  https://etherpad.openstack.org/p/LPC2016_PCI

although the discussion was pretty lively and jumped about, so I've had
to go from memory where the notes didn't capture everything that was
said.

To summarise, arm64 platforms differ in their handling of MSIs when compared
to x86:

  1. The physical memory map is not standardised (Jon pointed out that
     this is something that was realised late on)
  2. MSIs are usually treated the same as DMA writes, in that they must be
     mapped by the SMMU page tables so that they target a physical MSI
     doorbell
  3. On some platforms, MSIs bypass the SMMU entirely (e.g. due to an MSI
     doorbell built into the PCI RC)
  4. Platforms typically have some set of addresses that abort before
     reaching the SMMU (e.g. because the PCI identifies them as P2P).

All of this means that userspace (QEMU) needs to identify the memory
regions corresponding to points (3) and (4) and ensure that they are
not allocated in the guest physical (IPA) space. For platforms that can
remap the MSI doorbell as in (2), then some space also needs to be
allocated for that.

Rather than treat these as separate problems, a better interface is to
tell userspace about a set of reserved regions, and have this include
the MSI doorbell, irrespective of whether or not it can be remapped.
Don suggested that we statically pick an address for the doorbell in a
similar way to x86, and have the kernel map it there. We could even pick
0xfee00000. If it conflicts with a reserved region on the platform (due
to (4)), then we'd obviously have to (deterministically?) allocate it
somewhere else, but probably within the bottom 4G.

The next question is how to tell userspace about all of the reserved
regions. Initially, the idea was to extend VFIO, however Alex pointed
out a horrible scenario:

  1. QEMU spawns a VM on system 0
  2. VM is migrated to system 1
  3. QEMU attempts to passthrough a device using PCI hotplug

In this scenario, the guest memory map is chosen at step (1), yet there
is no VFIO fd available to determine the reserved regions. Furthermore,
the reserved regions may vary between system 0 and system 1. This pretty
much rules out using VFIO to determine the reserved regions. Alex suggested
that the SMMU driver can advertise the regions via /sys/class/iommu/. This
would solve part of the problem, but migration between systems with
different memory maps can still cause problems if the reserved regions
of the new system conflict with the guest memory map chosen by QEMU.
Jon pointed out that most people are pretty conservative about hardware
choices when migrating between them -- that is, they may only migrate
between different revisions of the same SoC, or they know ahead of time
all of the memory maps they want to support and this could be communicated
by way of configuration to libvirt. It would be up to QEMU to fail the
hotplug if it detected a conflict. Alex asked if there was a security
issue with DMA bypassing the SMMU, but there aren't currently any systems
where that is known to happen. Such a system would surely not be safe for
passthrough.

Ben mused that a way to handle conflicts dynamically might be to hotplug
on the entire host bridge in the guest, passing firmware tables describing
the new reserved regions as a property of the host bridge. Whilst this
may well solve the issue, it was largely considered future work due to
its invasive nature and dependency on firmware tables (and guest support)
that do not currently exist.

Will