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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm•com>
To: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro•org>
Cc: Julien Thierry <Julien.Thierry@arm•com>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm•com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm•com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm•com>,
	stable@vger•kernel.org, mark.brown@arm•com,
	Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm•linux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists•infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 06/44] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 10:40:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190830094036.GF46475@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <093a9777605bdd2ab2c33948a4e7a3fbb275de4d.1567077734.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org>

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 05:03:51PM +0530, Viresh Kumar wrote:
> From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm•com>
> 
> commit 6314d90e64936c584f300a52ef173603fb2461b5 upstream.
> 
> In a similar manner to array_index_mask_nospec, this patch introduces an
> assembly macro (mask_nospec64) which can be used to bound a value under
> speculation. This macro is then used to ensure that the indirect branch
> through the syscall table is bounded under speculation, with out-of-range
> addresses speculating as calls to sys_io_setup (0).
> 
> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm•com>
> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm•com>
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm•com>
> [ v4.4: use existing scno & sc_nr definitions ]
> Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro•org>

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm•com> [v4.4 backport]

Mark.

> ---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 11 +++++++++++
>  arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S          |  1 +
>  2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
> index 683c2875278f..2b30363a3a89 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
> @@ -102,6 +102,17 @@
>  	hint	#20
>  	.endm
>  
> +/*
> + * Sanitise a 64-bit bounded index wrt speculation, returning zero if out
> + * of bounds.
> + */
> +	.macro	mask_nospec64, idx, limit, tmp
> +	sub	\tmp, \idx, \limit
> +	bic	\tmp, \tmp, \idx
> +	and	\idx, \idx, \tmp, asr #63
> +	csdb
> +	.endm
> +
>  #define USER(l, x...)				\
>  9999:	x;					\
>  	.section __ex_table,"a";		\
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> index 4c5013b09dcb..e6aec982dea9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> @@ -697,6 +697,7 @@ el0_svc_naked:					// compat entry point
>  	b.ne	__sys_trace
>  	cmp     scno, sc_nr                     // check upper syscall limit
>  	b.hs	ni_sys
> +	mask_nospec64 scno, sc_nr, x19	// enforce bounds for syscall number
>  	ldr	x16, [stbl, scno, lsl #3]	// address in the syscall table
>  	blr	x16				// call sys_* routine
>  	b	ret_fast_syscall
> -- 
> 2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b
> 

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  reply	other threads:[~2019-08-30  9:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-29 11:33 [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 00/44] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 01/44] arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:39   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 02/44] arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:40   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 03/44] arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:40   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 04/44] arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:40   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 05/44] arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:40   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 06/44] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:40   ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 07/44] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:40   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 08/44] arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:41   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 09/44] mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:41   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 10/44] arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:41   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 11/44] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:41   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 12/44] arm64: cpufeature: Test 'matches' pointer to find the end of the list Viresh Kumar
2019-09-02 14:27   ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-05  7:45     ` Viresh Kumar
2019-09-06 13:49       ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-10  9:35         ` Viresh Kumar
2019-10-11  6:36         ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 13/44] arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 14/44] arm64: Introduce cpu_die_early Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 15/44] arm64: Add a helper for parking CPUs in a loop Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 16/44] arm64: Move cpu_die_early to smp.c Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 17/44] arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 18/44] arm64: errata: Calling enable functions for CPU errata too Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 19/44] arm64: Rearrange CPU errata workaround checks Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 20/44] arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 21/44] arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 22/44] drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 23/44] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 24/44] arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 25/44] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 26/44] arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 27/44] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 28/44] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 29/44] arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 30/44] arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 31/44] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 32/44] arm64: cputype info for Broadcom Vulcan Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 33/44] arm64: cputype: Add MIDR values for Cavium ThunderX2 CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 34/44] arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 35/44] ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 36/44] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 37/44] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 38/44] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 39/44] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 40/44] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 41/44] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 42/44] arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 43/44] arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 44/44] arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30  9:42   ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-03  5:15     ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 16:18 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 00/44] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Mark Rutland

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