From: a.ryabinin@samsung•com (Andrey Ryabinin)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists•infradead.org
Subject: [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 08/21] mm: page_alloc: add kasan hooks on alloc and free pathes
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 10:54:04 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53C4D00C.3020000@samsung.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140715055255.GG11317@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE>
On 07/15/14 09:52, Joonsoo Kim wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 09, 2014 at 03:30:02PM +0400, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> Add kernel address sanitizer hooks to mark allocated page's addresses
>> as accessible in corresponding shadow region.
>> Mark freed pages as unaccessible.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung•com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/kasan.h | 6 ++++++
>> mm/Makefile | 2 ++
>> mm/kasan/kasan.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 1 +
>> mm/kasan/report.c | 7 +++++++
>> mm/page_alloc.c | 4 ++++
>> 6 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
>> index 7efc3eb..4adc0a1 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
>> @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ void kasan_disable_local(void);
>> void kasan_alloc_shadow(void);
>> void kasan_init_shadow(void);
>>
>> +void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
>> +void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
>> +
>> #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>>
>> static inline void unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) {}
>> @@ -28,6 +31,9 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_local(void) {}
>> static inline void kasan_init_shadow(void) {}
>> static inline void kasan_alloc_shadow(void) {}
>>
>> +static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
>> +static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
>> +
>> #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>>
>> #endif /* LINUX_KASAN_H */
>> diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
>> index dbe9a22..6a9c3f8 100644
>> --- a/mm/Makefile
>> +++ b/mm/Makefile
>> @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
>> # Makefile for the linux memory manager.
>> #
>>
>> +KASAN_SANITIZE_page_alloc.o := n
>> +
>> mmu-y := nommu.o
>> mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU) := gup.o highmem.o madvise.o memory.o mincore.o \
>> mlock.o mmap.o mprotect.o mremap.o msync.o rmap.o \
>> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
>> index e2cd345..109478e 100644
>> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
>> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
>> @@ -177,6 +177,24 @@ void __init kasan_init_shadow(void)
>> }
>> }
>>
>> +void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
>> +{
>> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + if (likely(page && !PageHighMem(page)))
>> + unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
>> +}
>> +
>> +void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
>> +{
>> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
>> + poison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
>> +}
>> +
>> void *kasan_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
>> {
>> if (unlikely(len == 0))
>> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
>> index 711ae4f..be9597e 100644
>> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
>> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
>> @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
>> #define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
>> #define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
>>
>> +#define KASAN_FREE_PAGE 0xFF /* page was freed */
>> #define KASAN_SHADOW_GAP 0xF9 /* address belongs to shadow memory */
>>
>> struct access_info {
>> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
>> index 2430e05..6ef9e57 100644
>> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
>> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
>> @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static void print_error_description(struct access_info *info)
>> case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
>> bug_type = "buffer overflow";
>> break;
>> + case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
>> + bug_type = "use after free";
>> + break;
>> case KASAN_SHADOW_GAP:
>> bug_type = "wild memory access";
>> break;
>> @@ -67,6 +70,10 @@ static void print_address_description(struct access_info *info)
>> page = virt_to_page(info->access_addr);
>>
>> switch (shadow_val) {
>> + case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
>> + dump_page(page, "kasan error");
>> + dump_stack();
>> + break;
>> case KASAN_SHADOW_GAP:
>> pr_err("No metainfo is available for this access.\n");
>> dump_stack();
>> diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
>> index 8c9eeec..67833d1 100644
>> --- a/mm/page_alloc.c
>> +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
>> @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
>> #include <linux/page-debug-flags.h>
>> #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
>> #include <linux/sched/rt.h>
>> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
>>
>> #include <asm/sections.h>
>> #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>> @@ -747,6 +748,7 @@ static bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
>>
>> trace_mm_page_free(page, order);
>> kmemcheck_free_shadow(page, order);
>> + kasan_free_pages(page, order);
>>
>> if (PageAnon(page))
>> page->mapping = NULL;
>> @@ -2807,6 +2809,7 @@ out:
>> if (unlikely(!page && read_mems_allowed_retry(cpuset_mems_cookie)))
>> goto retry_cpuset;
>>
>> + kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);
>> return page;
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__alloc_pages_nodemask);
>> @@ -6415,6 +6418,7 @@ int alloc_contig_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
>> if (end != outer_end)
>> free_contig_range(end, outer_end - end);
>>
>> + kasan_alloc_pages(pfn_to_page(start), end - start);
>> done:
>> undo_isolate_page_range(pfn_max_align_down(start),
>> pfn_max_align_up(end), migratetype);
>
> Hello,
>
> I don't think that this is right place for this hook.
>
I'm also made a stupid mistake here. kasan_alloc_pages() expects page order here,
not count of pages.
> There is a function, __isolate_free_pages(), which steals buddy pages
> from page allocator. So you should put this hook onto that function.
>
> alloc_contig_range() uses that function through below call path, so
> adding hook on it solves your issue here.
>
> alloc_contig_range() -> isolate_freepages_range() ->
> isolate_freepages_block() -> split_free_page -> __isolate_free_page()
>
> And, this also solves marking issue on compaction logic, since
> compaction also steal buddy pages from page allocator through
> isolate_freepages() -> isolate_freepages_block() -> split_free_page()
> -> __isolate_free_page().
>
Yep, I've seen some false positives when compaction
was enabled and just yesterday I've fixed it as your suggested.
I'm also going to move kasan_alloc_pages hook from alloc_pages_nodemask()
to prep_new_page. I think this is more right place for such hook and will
make possible to enable instrumentation for page_alloc.c
Thanks
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-15 6:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-09 11:29 [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 00/21] Address sanitizer for kernel (kasan) - dynamic memory error detector Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:29 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 01/21] Add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 14:26 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-07-10 7:31 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 19:29 ` Andi Kleen
2014-07-09 20:40 ` Yuri Gribov
2014-07-10 12:10 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 20:26 ` Dave Hansen
2014-07-10 12:12 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-10 15:55 ` Dave Hansen
2014-07-10 19:48 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-10 20:04 ` Dave Hansen
2014-07-09 20:37 ` Dave Hansen
2014-07-09 20:38 ` Dave Hansen
2014-07-10 11:55 ` Sasha Levin
2014-07-10 13:01 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-10 13:31 ` Sasha Levin
2014-07-10 13:39 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-10 14:02 ` Sasha Levin
2014-07-10 19:04 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-10 13:50 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:29 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 02/21] init: main: initialize kasan's shadow area on boot Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:29 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 03/21] x86: add kasan hooks fort memcpy/memmove/memset functions Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 19:31 ` Andi Kleen
2014-07-10 13:54 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:29 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 04/21] x86: boot: vdso: disable instrumentation for code not linked with kernel Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:29 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 05/21] x86: cpu: don't sanitize early stages of a secondary CPU boot Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 19:33 ` Andi Kleen
2014-07-10 13:15 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 06/21] x86: mm: init: allocate shadow memory for kasan Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 07/21] x86: Kconfig: enable kernel address sanitizer Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 08/21] mm: page_alloc: add kasan hooks on alloc and free pathes Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-15 5:52 ` Joonsoo Kim
2014-07-15 6:54 ` Andrey Ryabinin [this message]
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 09/21] mm: Makefile: kasan: don't instrument slub.c and slab_common.c files Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 10/21] mm: slab: share virt_to_cache() between slab and slub Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-15 5:53 ` Joonsoo Kim
2014-07-15 6:56 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 11/21] mm: slub: share slab_err and object_err functions Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 14:29 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-07-10 7:41 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-10 14:07 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 12/21] mm: util: move krealloc/kzfree to slab_common.c Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 14:32 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-07-10 7:43 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-10 14:08 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 13/21] mm: slub: add allocation size field to struct kmem_cache Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 14:33 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-07-10 8:44 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 14/21] mm: slub: kasan: disable kasan when touching unaccessible memory Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-15 6:04 ` Joonsoo Kim
2014-07-15 7:37 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-15 8:18 ` Joonsoo Kim
2014-07-15 9:51 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-15 14:26 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-07-15 15:02 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 15/21] mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer hooks to slub allocator Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 14:48 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-07-10 9:24 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-15 6:09 ` Joonsoo Kim
2014-07-15 7:45 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 16/21] arm: boot: compressed: disable kasan's instrumentation Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 17/21] arm: add kasan hooks fort memcpy/memmove/memset functions Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 18/21] arm: mm: reserve shadow memory for kasan Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 19/21] arm: Kconfig: enable kernel address sanitizer Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 20/21] fs: dcache: manually unpoison dname after allocation to shut up kasan's reports Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-15 6:12 ` Joonsoo Kim
2014-07-15 6:08 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2014-07-15 9:34 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-15 9:45 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2014-07-09 11:30 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 21/21] lib: add kmalloc_bug_test module Andrey Ryabinin
2014-07-09 21:19 ` [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 00/21] Address sanitizer for kernel (kasan) - dynamic memory error detector Dave Hansen
2014-07-09 21:44 ` Andi Kleen
2014-07-09 21:59 ` Vegard Nossum
2014-07-09 23:33 ` Dave Hansen
2014-07-10 0:03 ` Andi Kleen
2014-07-10 13:59 ` Andrey Ryabinin
[not found] ` <1421859105-25253-1-git-send-email-a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
2015-01-21 16:51 ` [PATCH v9 14/17] mm: vmalloc: pass additional vm_flags to __vmalloc_node_range() Andrey Ryabinin
[not found] ` <1422544321-24232-1-git-send-email-a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
2015-01-29 15:11 ` [PATCH v10 " Andrey Ryabinin
[not found] ` <1422985392-28652-1-git-send-email-a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
2015-02-03 17:43 ` [PATCH v11 16/19] " Andrey Ryabinin
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