Subject: Patch "[PATCH 23/30] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree

From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 19:06:14 +0200

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    [PATCH 23/30] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

to the 4.19-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     0023-cpu-speculation-Add-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.19 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <[email-masked]> know about it.

>From 1a85023111931463125a6da902675facd3e00c21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:28 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 23/30] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option

commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
   it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
   vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
  leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
  SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email-masked]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email-masked]>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <[email-masked]> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <[email-masked]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email-masked]>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <[email-masked]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email-masked]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email-masked]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email-masked]>
Cc: Waiman Long <[email-masked]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email-masked]>
Cc: Jon Masters <[email-masked]>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email-masked]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email-masked]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[email-masked]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email-masked]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email-masked]>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <[email-masked]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email-masked]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email-masked]>
Cc: Steven Price <[email-masked]>
Cc: Phil Auld <[email-masked]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email-masked]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email-masked]>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                           | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index df8d10668b11..6a1b94afb005 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2502,6 +2502,30 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
+			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
+			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
+			options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				This is the default behavior.
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 3c87ad888ed3..57ae83c4d5f4 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -189,4 +189,28 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index dc250ec2c096..bc6c880a093f 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2278,3 +2278,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);
-- 
2.21.0

Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email-masked] are

queue-4.19/0025-powerpc-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-opti.patch
queue-4.19/0022-x86-speculation-mds-Print-SMT-vulnerable-on-MSBDS-wi.patch
queue-4.19/0024-x86-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.19/0023-cpu-speculation-Add-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.19/0018-x86-speculation-mds-Add-mds-full-nosmt-cmdline-optio.patch
queue-4.19/0030-x86-speculation-mds-Fix-documentation-typo.patch
queue-4.19/0027-x86-speculation-mds-Add-mitigations-support-for-MDS.patch
queue-4.19/0020-x86-speculation-mds-Add-SMT-warning-message.patch
queue-4.19/0001-Documentation-l1tf-Fix-small-spelling-typo.patch
queue-4.19/0019-x86-speculation-Move-arch_smt_update-call-to-after-m.patch
queue-4.19/0026-s390-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.19/0021-x86-speculation-mds-Fix-comment.patch