From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de•ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium•org>, linux-kernel@vger•kernel.org
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat•com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca•com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail•hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity•net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux•org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm•com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm•com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro•org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel•crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman•id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel•com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel•com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft•net>,
x86@kernel•org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux•com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel•org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google•com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge•com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation•org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel•org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse•de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail•com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse•cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail•com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat•com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google•com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject•org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists•infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger•kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists•ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger•kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger•kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack•org,
kernel-hardening@lists•openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2016 09:30:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <577E04FF.1090000@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467843928-29351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On 07/07/2016 12:25 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This is a start of the mainline port of PAX_USERCOPY[1]. After I started
> writing tests (now in lkdtm in -next) for Casey's earlier port[2], I
> kept tweaking things further and further until I ended up with a whole
> new patch series. To that end, I took Rik's feedback and made a number
> of other changes and clean-ups as well.
>
> Based on my understanding, PAX_USERCOPY was designed to catch a few
> classes of flaws around the use of copy_to_user()/copy_from_user(). These
> changes don't touch get_user() and put_user(), since these operate on
> constant sized lengths, and tend to be much less vulnerable. There
> are effectively three distinct protections in the whole series,
> each of which I've given a separate CONFIG, though this patch set is
> only the first of the three intended protections. (Generally speaking,
> PAX_USERCOPY covers what I'm calling CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY (this) and
> CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_WHITELIST (future), and PAX_USERCOPY_SLABS covers
> CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC (future).)
>
> This series, which adds CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, checks that objects
> being copied to/from userspace meet certain criteria:
> - if address is a heap object, the size must not exceed the object's
> allocated size. (This will catch all kinds of heap overflow flaws.)
> - if address range is in the current process stack, it must be within the
> current stack frame (if such checking is possible) or at least entirely
> within the current process's stack. (This could catch large lengths that
> would have extended beyond the current process stack, or overflows if
> their length extends back into the original stack.)
> - if the address range is part of kernel data, rodata, or bss, allow it.
> - if address range is page-allocated, that it doesn't span multiple
> allocations.
> - if address is within the kernel text, reject it.
> - everything else is accepted
>
> The patches in the series are:
> - The core copy_to/from_user() checks, without the slab object checks:
> 1- mm: Hardened usercopy
> - Per-arch enablement of the protection:
> 2- x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 3- ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 4- arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 5- ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 6- powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 7- sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Was there a reason why you did not change s390?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-07 7:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-06 22:25 [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 5:37 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Baruch Siach
2016-07-07 7:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 17:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-07 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-07-07 8:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 5:34 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 9:22 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-07-07 16:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 16:35 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-07 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 10:07 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-07 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-06 22:25 ` [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-07 4:35 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <577ddc18.d351190a.1fa54.ffffbe79SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-07 18:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-08 10:19 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-08 13:45 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 16:20 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-07-08 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-08 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 5:58 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-09 6:07 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <57809299.84b3370a.5390c.ffff9e58SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-09 6:17 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-09 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 6:08 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-07-07 7:30 ` Christian Borntraeger [this message]
2016-07-07 17:27 ` [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-08 8:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-07-08 18:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 2:22 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 2:44 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-09 7:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-09 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-07-09 12:58 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-09 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-09 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-09 23:16 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 9:16 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-10 12:03 ` PaX Team
2016-07-10 12:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:34 ` Kees Cook
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