Subject: Re: [PATCH net 1/3] net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 00:06:13 +0200

On 10/10/2014 12:04 PM, Joshua Kinard wrote:
...
> If I am reading correctly, this crash can only be triggered by actually getting
> through the SCTP handshake, then sending this specially-crafted ASCONF chunk?
> Meaning a blind nmap scan using this tactic against a random netblock wouldn't
> just randomly knock servers offline?  This would seem to reduce the attack
> surface a quite bit by requiring the remote endpoint to actually respond.

Sorry, have been on travel almost whole day ... yes, handshake has to be
completed before that. So a scan/probe would need to establish a connection
first and ASCONF would need to be supported.

> Is there a CVE # for this?

CVE-2014-3673